Sheila Carapico, ed., Arabia Incognita: Dispatches from Yemen and the Gulf (New Texts Out Now)

Sheila Carapico, ed., Arabia Incognita: Dispatches from Yemen and the Gulf (New Texts Out Now)

Sheila Carapico, ed., Arabia Incognita: Dispatches from Yemen and the Gulf (New Texts Out Now)

By : Sheila Carapico

Sheila Carapico, editor,  Arabia Incognita: Dispatches from Yemen and the Gulf. Charlottesville: Just World Books, 2015. 

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Sheila Carapico (SC): This book began as an activist political project, a form of protest against a cruel war. Colleagues at MERIP were thinking of compiling a simple PDF reader to help students and others understand the background to the military intervention in Yemen the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia called Operation Decisive Storm in late April 2015. Then Helena Cobban of Just World Books invited me to “curate” an edited volume. I devoted the summer of 2015 to reading thirty-five years’ worth of articles in Middle East Report in print and online. I was the most frequent contributor, and also wrote the chapter introductions, but there are more than thirty other authors, which gives the volume considerable breadth as well as depth. Essays are arranged in broadly chronological order but also by topic. Many pieces were condensed to make space for everything that helped put the disgraceful Saudi-led, US-backed campaign into historical and political context.

The MERIP archive was a rich trove of real-time dispatches by some remarkably prescient researchers who depicted perennial contradictions between the opulent stability of Gulf monarchies and the gritty chaos of their poverty-stricken southern neighbor. Entries explain local histories alongside Cold War geopolitics, oil dependency, politicized Islam, two American wars in Iraq, the “global war on terror,” royal panic over the 2011 Arab uprisings, and ever-increasing weapons purchases particularly by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. One subtle but persistent theme is American willingness to support the Kingdom’s hegemonic aspirations in unruly Yemen.   

The campaign ostensibly against Houthi rebels and remnants of the Salih regime is now in its third year. Both the Houthi-Salih militias and the Saudi-led coalition commit war crimes, but only the latter have fighter jets, battleships, and help from the US including surveillance and in-air refueling. Fighting directly killed as many as 10,000 people in the first year and a half and has wounded countless others, but the even greater catastrophe has been the wanton destruction of essential infrastructure, including hospitals, roads, power stations, sanitation services, and ports, which, together with a naval blockade ostensibly to prevent arms smuggling, has decimated health care and put nearly seven million people on the verge of famine and another seventeen million in the category the UN calls “food insecure.” Already in December 2016 UNICEF estimated that a Yemeni child died of preventable causes (starvation and treatable diseases) every ten minutes. Now, a serious cholera epidemic is multiplying the suffering. It is a man-made humanitarian disaster.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

SC: This collection is organized around the idea that the Arabian Peninsula constitutes a distinct, inter-connected subsystem of the Middle East and of global politics, in the sense that changes anywhere in the Peninsula reverberate throughout, affecting the whole as well as the separate parts; in the sense that there are some distinguishing patterns for the entire “organism;” and in the sense of the subsystem’s interactions with the outside world. Some broadly framing, big-picture  contributions explore the connections explicitly, treating the Peninsula as a unit; others do so by scrutinizing specific circumstances of labor migration, armed conflicts, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the politics of water and oil, the 2011 uprisings and what happened next, and vignettes from specific localities.  Juxtaposing these tops the sum of the parts. The most prevalent themes are political economy, the American or Anglo-American military footprint, and socio-political movements. But there is also much about gender, and class; and strong ethnographic voices from very different microclimates and ecologies.

The multi-vocal, multi-local, real-time dimension is instructive, and different from retrospective analysis I, or anyone writing a book “from scratch”, would offer. For example, the authors of early accounts of the Houthi movement in Sa’dah province near the Saudi-Yemeni border – some of the earliest accounts anywhere about the origins of the movement – traced that Zaydi revival movement led by the al-Houthi family to reactions against concerted Wahhabi-Saudi proselytizing in a remote, mountainous region; they saw no reason to mention Iran, which was not involved in the series of local rebellions the Houthis fought against the Sana’a government before 2011. These articles and other stories focused on different issues therefore contradict the narrative generated in Riyadh and widely reproduced in the Anglophone media over the past couple of years that American weapons are being used to combat “Iranian proxies” battling the “legitimate government of Yemen”– not by arguing to the contrary, but rather with nuanced, up-close reporting on situations in Sa’dah and elsewhere in the entire Peninsula. Clearly the so-called “sectarian civil war” in Yemen is a recent permutation of the self-declared Sunni monarchies’ geostrategic rivalry with the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as those ruling dynasties’ discrimination against their own Shi`a populations. Overall, ample evidence is presented that the problems that provoked Yemen’s Southern Movement (hirak) and the 2011 popular demonstrations, respectively, are rooted in militarism and corruption rather than religion, and that the Gulf’s royal families have for decades feared mass mobilization in the most populous, least prosperous, perennially restive part of the Peninsula.  

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

SC: I used the title “Arabia Incognita” some years ago for a chapter in a book edited by Bob Vitalis and Madawi al-Rasheed, for a more conceptual “Invitation to Arabian Peninsula Studies” essay that featured historical maps of the whole Peninsula, and that made the point that the Arab Gulf petro-states and Yemen are not separate regions but part of a single system. I’ve spent a total of more than six years in Yemen and a total of only a few weeks in the Emirates, Oman, and Qatar, so it was a pleasure to incorporate the wisdom of other scholars and journalists in what is still quite rare, a volume that indeed uncovers the whole Peninsula and explores its inner workings. This book is a natural extension from my previous work, therefore, but it covers more terrain. Also, again, it is not so much my own scholarship as a collective project with an explicit political message.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

SC: The book is intended for broad readership, what Helena Cobban has called “the NPR listener.” Now this might not be what she meant, but NPR listeners would hardly be aware of any events in the Peninsula other than American presidential visits and a handful of military operations, because All Things Considered and Morning Edition all but ignore the Peninsula and scarcely mention the war. Arabia Incognita: Dispatches from Yemen and the Gulf is curated for non-specialists (including even some academics who study the Mediterranean part of the Middle East but can’t remember which of the formerly two Yemens was Socialist). Specifically, the intended audiences are anti-war activists unfamiliar with or confused about the current conflict. Hopefully it will find its way into the hands of some of the fifty members of Congress who express doubts about arming the Saudi war machine, or their staff advisors, too.  In condensing entries I eliminated both endnotes and passages with too many confusing details, to make it as accessible as possible (there is even a note advising serious scholars to go back to the originally published articles for the references).  So the sixty readings are a few pages each and easy to follow. Furthermore, to make it more readable or even skim-able we included five custom maps (made by my colleague Kimberley Browne at the University of Richmond and her Spatial Analysis Lab colleagues) and fifteen recent satirical cartoons by the Yemeni caricaturist Sameer Al-Shameeri.

As for impact, we had two objectives, both implied above and in the conclusion: to make the Peninsula less unfamiliar and obscure; and to stimulate opposition to the war, and to weapons sales to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its allies in the unprovoked assault on a very poor country.  The concluding paragraphs read as follows:

“The title of this volume is Arabia Incognita, meaning Unknown, Misunderstood, or Unrecognized Arabia. As the old order on the Peninsula collapses, some analysts and reporters have begun referring to a “forgotten war” in Yemen. Yemenis respond sardonically that it is impossible to forget what was never comprehended to begin with.

As this anthology goes to press, there’s no good news for the war-torn peninsula. I do hope, however, that Arabia might be less incomprehensible in the future. Human rights activists and area specialists are calling more attention to the militarization of a contest for state power. Investigative journalists, counter-terrorism experts and think-tank analysts—until now unmindful of the subcontinent’s internal convulsions and their global implications—are studying up. “Arabia Felix” may be a distant reality, but at least the Peninsula may not remain Incognita.” 

Excerpt from the Introduction to Arabia Incognita

Of the three kinds of societies found in the Arabian Peninsula, the one with which most outsiders may have the most familiarity is the string of super-rich city-states along the sinuous coast of the Persian Gulf. First-class globe-trotters may have passed through the upscale airport in Dubai (which is one of seven tiny princedoms that make up the United Arab Emirates, UAE), or may have flown on Emirates Airlines. American or European students and tourists may have spent time in the state-of-the-art branch campuses of western universities established in Qatar or the UAE, or in the museums and shopping malls that now dot much of the UAE. Over the past fifty years millions of contract workers—pursuing a range of occupations, from hotel managers, to construction workers, to teachers—have flocked to the Gulf city-states from Asia, the Arab world, and Eastern Africa. Some have remained there for decades (generally, under tight surveillance); others, once their contracts have finished or if they have raised their voices seeking better working conditions or greater freedoms, have been summarily returned to their original homes. Al-Jazeera, the global news network based in the Qatari capital Doha, is now a familiar brand-name worldwide. Doha and several other twenty-first–century Persian Gulf cities glimmer with high-modernist architecture financed from petrochemicals, built by South Asian migrant laborers, and made livable only by relentless air-conditioning.

Since 1981, Saudi Arabia and the five other Arab states along the Gulf have worked together in a joint defense organization called the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which has been strongly supported by the United States and its NATO allies and provides a massive market for Western arms manufacturers. Tens of thousands of American armed service personnel have spent time in the Gulf protecting the oil-rich monarchies against threats from the Soviet Union, Iraq, and Iran.

The second broad environment in the Peninsula is the vast desert interior, most of which lies within Saudi Arabia. While millions of Muslims journey to Mecca for the annual hajj pilgrimage, relatively few Christians or Jews—apart from oil executives and military contractors—have been permitted to visit the ultra-secretive Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, or, for that matter, Kuwait or Oman. (Among the monarchies, only in Saudi Arabia and Oman are citizen-subjects  the majority of residents.) Saudi Arabia is the only state in the world to be named for its founding family, the descendants of whom still hold tightly to the reins of government there today. From its very beginning, in the 18th century of the common era, the “Saudi” political system was based on the maintenance of tight alliance between the “al-Saud” (the Saud family) and the descendants and followers of a puritanical and highly intolerant religious leader called Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The Wahhabis, as these religio-sectarian activists are known, continue to play an important role in the kingdom’s internal governance—and in many aspects of its foreign policy—until today.

Yemen’s mountainous, relatively fertile and heavily populated environment provides a strong contrast to the natural and human geography of most of Saudi Arabia. In the days of the British Empire, the Yemeni city of Aden, perched at the corner where the Red Sea joins the Indian Ocean, was a vital coaling station for British ships traveling to India or points further east. The present-day Republic of Yemen stretches up along the Red Sea a little, and out along the Indian Ocean coast to join with Oman. Its many mountain fastnesses contain a diverse array of micro-cultures, many of them with long and distinguished urban traditions—and a correspondingly great array of political movements, some regional, some religious, some ideological, and some more interest-based.

In this book, you will find more writings about Yemen than about any of the other countries of the Arabian Peninsula. The reason for this is simple. Contributors to Middle East Report are overwhelmingly social scientists, along with a smattering of journalists. And the kind of field research that social scientists do, or the kind of free-ranging, on-the-ground reporting that good journalists seek to do, is extremely hard to do in Saudi Arabia or any of the other monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. Those monarchies nearly all have truly terrible human-rights records and afford no protection whatever for the freedom of most forms of information-gathering, association or expression. Saudi Arabia, where in May 2014 blogger Raif Badawi was sentenced to ten years in prison and 1,000 public lashings with a whip, purely for what he had published on his blog, may have the very worst record in this regard. But the other GCC members are not far behind when it comes to stifling free enquiry and free expression. Until the exigencies of war overtook it in early 2015, Yemen provided a much more fertile and welcoming environment for the kinds of inquiry that MER contributors like to pursue. Nonetheless, both in MER in general and in the compilation of this anthology, we have worked hard to include well-informed dispatches from other countries in the Peninsula.

In 2011, news consumers worldwide became somewhat familiar with the exciting news coming out of Yemen, which was the only place in the Peninsula apart from the city-state of Bahrain where the kinds of popular mobilization typical of the “Arab Spring” gained any real foothold. Yemeni pro-democracy organizer Tawakkul Karman was even awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her role in helping lead the Yemeni movement. But in Bahrain, the King, with considerable military help from Saudi Arabia, was able to beat back the democracy movement. And in Yemen, in March 2015, amidst the deep political turmoil into which the country had fallen, Saudi Arabia’s newly installed King Salman and his Defense Minister (and son), Mohammed Bin Salman, ordered air-strikes to try to reverse militarily gains by a Yemeni militia known as the Houthi movement

King Salman’s colossal military operation in Yemen was joined by the United Arab Emirates and some other regional coalition partners, deploying advanced weapons and surveillance technology sold by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada. As Yemen’s ports, utilities and other infrastructure were pounded by many long months of aerial bombardment and a naval blockade, humanitarian catastrophe ensued for an already-impoverished population of nearly 27 million Yemenis. United Nations relief agencies, human rights observers, and historic conservationists drew some attention to this crisis, though de-escalation and ceasefire still seemed far away.

King Salman may have hoped for a speedy victory; but such was not to be. Though the Saudi-led coalition succeeded in pushing back the Houthis from Aden and some other areas of South Yemen, they made little headway in restoring any legitimate, functioning government anywhere in the country. And while the battles between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis (allied with their old nemesis, the deposed dictator `Ali `Abdullah Salih) continued in many of the western and central parts of the country and broad swathes of the east, Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP, long a target of American drone strikes) and even the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS, newly arrived in Yemen) were often gaining ground.

[Excerpted from Arabia Incognita, Dispatches from Yemen and the Gulf, with permission of the author, © 2015.]

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      Sheila Carapico, Political Aid and Arab Activism: Democracy Promotion, Justice, and Representation. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this bo

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.